A new link between price format and consumer preferences is introduced in the context of transactions related to multicomponent goods. Multicomponent goods combine a focal object or service (an item of clothing, theater tickets, etc.) with one or more infrastructural elements that fulfill some essential, subordinate role (shipping and handling, booking service, etc.). In this context firms need to decide whether to post a single price (aggregate pricing) or break down the expense into a set of charges that reflects the underlying product structure (disaggregate pricing). Evidence from five studies consistently supports the general hypothesis that price format modifies the shape of consumer response. An information processing explanation is proposed whereby the salience of infrastructural components in evaluation is contingent on price format. This theory reconciles existing contradictory results in the literature and suggests that pricing impacts perceived value as much as it captures it. KEY WORDS: Consumer behavior, framing effects, attention, information processing, pricing research.
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of surcharges imposed by service firms and some inconsistencies in the existing literature suggest that consumers actually respond more favorably to aggregated prices.
With these ambiguities in mind, this paper systematically investigates the influence of price format on perceptions of value and proposes a parsimonious psychological mechanism that jointly explains contingent effects. The general hypothesis is that alternative price formats change the relative weight (or salience) of infrastructural components in goods evaluation and that this contingent weighing affects preferences in a predictable manner. This hypothesis builds on the premise that consumers trade off the perceived accuracy and effort of applying different evaluation strategies (Huber 1980; Johnson and Payne 1985; Shugan 1980) . Because consumers invest sufficient cognitive effort in assessing their preferences for infrastructural components only when these are allocated a proportion of the total expense, an aggregated price induces an evaluation based exclusively on the merits of the focal component. Conversely, a disaggregated price facilitates evaluation of both components resulting in a multivariate judgment that, ironically, often assigns excessive importance to infrastructural components.
Throughout, the analysis focuses on consumer evaluations of multicomponent goods (hereafter referred to simply as products). A multicomponent good is understood to be a product or service that involves two types of components, (1) a focal component, being the object of direct interest to the consumer (e.g., an item of clothing, theater tickets, groceries), and (2) an infrastructural component, a secondary or subordinate but nevertheless necessary element (e.g., shipping and handling, booking service, delivery scheduling). 2 Firms that market multicomponent goods need to decide whether to post a single, consolidated price (aggregate pricing) or a set of smaller charges that reflect this underlying product structure (disaggregate pricing).
In the next section we review the relevant literature on price format and discuss some of its key limitations. We then introduce a simple descriptive model of consumer response that addresses these concerns and captures the proposed link between price format and preference formation. Five studies that test the validity of the theory are then presented. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings.
Background
The existing marketing literature includes theories consistent with an impact of price format on demand. Relying on mental accounting (Thaler 1985; Thaler and Johnson 1990) , one could argue that posting a disaggregated price will increase the perceived impact of the loss of money associated with the transaction; that is, partitioning an expense increases price sensitivity.
A possibly stronger argument, however, might be made that disaggregated prices reduce price sensitivity. As pointed out by Ayres and Nalebuff (2003) , disaggregate pricing could enable firms to increase revenue while seeming to price competitively in markets that correspond to separate components. Morwitz et al. (1998) have demonstrated that participants who were charged a tax on their bid price consistently paid more for the same product than those in a control group that was not so taxed. To explain this result, the authors suggested that consumers process disaggregated prices by anchoring on the larger expense and adjusting (insufficiently) for the remainder. Chakravarti et al. (2002) have proposed, with reference to mental accounting, that positive effects of disaggregated prices are attributable to an induced perception that benefits are multiple (segregated).
In the aggregate, existing evidence suggests that preferences are affected by price format. The direction of this effect, however, is ambiguous. Mental accounting has been evoked both to support and to discredit disaggregate pricing depending on whether the focus was on gains (benefits) or losses 6 (expenses), respectively. Similarly, the argument that partitioned pricing increases demand due to an anchoring and adjustment heuristic was supported in auction but not in choice tasks. These empirical and theoretical ambiguities point to the need for a parsimonious theory that can make convincing contingent predictions.
The present work connects not only with the emerging literature on price format, but also with recent efforts in economics to formulate conditions under which profit-maximizing firms should market products that include "shrouded" attributes (Ellison 2005; Gabaix and Laibson 2005) . An infrastructural component is a particular type of shrouded attribute, one that is both mandatory and common knowledge at the time of purchase. In these models the derived equilibrium is for firms to attract consumers by pricing the focal, desired component competitively and hiding from the naïve segment of the population ancillary charges on discretionary (but often unavoidable) components.
Themes such as the temporal reframing of transactions (Gourville 1998; Prelec and Loewenstein 1998) and of bundling as a vehicle for price discrimination under heterogeneous demand (e.g., Schmalensee 1982) or means to exploit the behavioral consequences of perceived savings (e.g. Yadav and Monroe 1993) are not directly addressed, the emphasis here being on single products with multiple components. Similarly, this paper is conceptually related to other discussions of framing effects (e.g., Hauser 1986; Levin, Schneider, and Gaeth 1998; Park, Jun, and Macinnis 2000) , but distinguished by the focus on price as the key attribute of interest.
Consumer Response to Price Format
According to standard utility theory preferences should be invariant with respect to the mode of presentation of market offers. The present research argues, to the contrary, that alternative descriptions 7 of the same terms of exchange will, by affecting the relative salience of a product's multiple components, produce systematically different judgments. Our theory can be captured in the following formalization of the evaluation of good X composed of focal component x f and infrastructural component x i offered at total price P:
{ } is equal to 1 when a distinct positive price p i is posted for the infrastructural component (and equal to 0 otherwise), and β ≥ 0 represents a bias that exaggerates the importance of the infrastructural component when it is accounted for. Such a bias is hypothesized because (when activated) the tangible and habitual nature of infrastructural elements is expected to confer on their evaluation a perception of relative certainty or diagnosticity that consumers might favor (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000) . The remainder of this section offers additional justification for this model and explains how our experimental studies test its underlying hypotheses.
Posting an all-inclusive price creates a mismatch between the number of components and prices to evaluate making the evaluation of individual components effortful and increasing the likelihood that buyers will fail to fully explore their preferences (Smith 1976) . If one assumes that individuals trade off the perceived accuracy and effort of applying different evaluation strategies (Huber 1980; Johnson and Payne 1985; Shugan 1980) , the most plausible scenario is that consumers will simplify the evaluation process and draw inferences based only on a single, perceptually dominant piece of information or heuristic cue: the focal component (Kardes, Posavac, and Cronley 2004; Yadav 1994 ).
The use of this heuristic is instrumental in the sense that it is directed by the consumer's prominent goal. By focusing on the most salient component the consumer minimizes cognitive effort (Fiske and Taylor 1984) and maximizes the likelihood of correctly evaluating the offer (as infrastructural 8 components represent a smaller portion of the total expense).
It is easier for consumers to impute a subjective judgment for each component when the price of a good is disaggregated. But the literature on information processing suggests that integration of these values into an overall evaluation is subject to bias (Gaeth et al. 1990; Kahn and Meyer 1991) . We propose that product evaluations are based on the appraisal of both focal and infrastructural components and that the weights assigned to each depend on their relative diagnosticity for the task at hand. We also suggest that consumers generally have a perception of greater diagnosticity for infrastructural components because these are more frequently encountered (e.g., virtually all catalog transactions involve delivery) and homogeneous (e.g., books might be many, but delivery methods are few) than the focal element. Infrastructural components thus tend to be overweighed during preference formation when the price format re-sensitizes consumers to their presence (Wathieu 2004 ). This logic can be contrasted with the anchoring and adjustment process suggested by Morwitz et al., price disaggregation in the present model being assumed to highlight the secondary component rather than cause it to be discounted. 
Method
The experiment employed a 2 (price format: aggregate, disaggregate) × 2 (perceived value of infrastructural component: good deal, bad deal) between-subjects design. Each participant was exposed to two purchase scenarios, one involving air travel, the other flowers (Appendix A reproduces the stimulus used for the air travel replicate). The infrastructural components were in-flight entertainment plus meal service and a message card, respectively.
For each scenario participants were presented with two alternatives described by quality attributes and price. 3 The within-subjects allocation of stimuli was randomized, with the added constraint that participants should not be exposed to the same condition twice. Option A, the comparison alternative, was held constant across conditions and featured low quality and price. Option B, the test alternative, varied with the experimental design and included a high-quality/high-price focal component. The perceived value of the infrastructural component was manipulated by varying, for the same price, the quality of the benefit provided. Participants were asked to read the scenario and indicate their relative preference using an 8-point scale (1 = "definitely option A," 8 = "definitely option B"), then rate the overall attractiveness of each offer on a 7-point scale (1 = "very unattractive," 7 = "very attractive"). As a manipulation check, the perceived value of the infrastructural component was measured by an attractiveness rating on a scale from -3 ("very unattractive") to 3 ("very attractive").
The participants were 210 registered members of a subject pool managed by the research center of a large business school on the east coast of the United States. The general population of 5, 447 members is, on average, 39% male and 31 years of age. Eighty-seven percent of the members have completed undergraduate education or higher. Participants were selected at random and recruited via email. No specific eligibility requirement was specified. The experiment was carried out online.
Accessed through a designated URL, the experiment was introduced generically as an exercise in understanding consumer decision-making and interspersed among a series of other, unrelated survey questions. Participants were informed in advance of the expected duration of the poll (approximately 20 minutes) as well as the time interval during which the URL remained active (typically 24 hours).
They were also told that participation involved hypothetical purchase decisions, that there were no right or wrong answers, and that they should consider only their own preferences. Participation was voluntary, with a $5 payment upon completion.
Results
Responses were examined using analysis of variance (ANOVA) and planned orthogonal contrasts. A preliminary analysis showed no effect of the within-subjects allocation of replicates to participants.
This analysis also indicated that the perceived value of the infrastructural components was manipulated as intended: participants rated "good deal" infrastructural components as more attractive than those that represented a "bad deal" (M good deal = 1.95 versus M bad deal = -1.15; t(405) = 8.58, p < .001). Finally, the use of product category as a covariate was significant. A separate ANOVA that included product category as a fully crossed factor, however, revealed a baseline main effect but no significant interaction with the remaining experimental variables. For that reason, it was decided to report only aggregate results. 4 The two preference measures (relative preference and overall attractiveness), being sufficiently correlated (α = .73), were converted into one variable by standardizing both scales on a 10-point range and averaging (Nunnaly and Bernstein 1994 Figure 1 .
Recall that our framework implies (1) that a change in the perceived value of infrastructural components affects the overall evaluation of a product sold at a disaggregated price, but has no bearing when this price is all-inclusive, and (2) 13
Extension 1: Control Condition with Partial Description
Further evidence that aggregate pricing induced participants to neglect infrastructural components was obtained by complementing the main experimental design with a control condition in which the test alternative was described without reference to infrastructural components. If the proposed effect of price format on information processing holds, planned contrasts should reveal significant differences only with respect to the two disaggregated price conditions. Consistent with H1, participants evaluated the test alternative similarly across all aggregate pricing conditions (where M control = 6.78) but reacted as predicted when presented with disaggregated prices (Table 1) . 
Extension 2: Increased Salience of Price Format Manipulation
Would the results of Study 1 change if participants were explicitly told that the total price of the two alternatives is the same and that the only difference is in the way the expense is presented? To answer to this question we replicated the experimental design in Study 1, adding the following initial instructions.
In the following situation we are interested in understanding your response to alternative ways of presenting price information. The alternatives described below are equivalent in terms of total price but differ in how this price is broken up. Think about how you would react if you were facing this situation and then answer the accompanying questions.
This experiment employed a similar 2 (price format: aggregate, disaggregate) × 2 (perceived value of infrastructural component: good deal, bad deal) between-subjects design. Two new product categories were used -hotel accommodation plus fitness center access and groceries plus delivery scheduling -14 and participants again answered questions for both scenarios (see Appendix B for an example) responding, in each instance, to the stimulus that the firm had recently increased its price and was now deciding how to present the new price to consumers. New Format 1 was held constant, listing a simple price without reference to the infrastructural component; New Format 2 changed according to the experimental conditions. The perceived value of the infrastructural component was manipulated by varying the fit between the needs of the average customer (as portrayed in the stimulus) and what the firm offered.
Participants were asked to read the scenario and rate on an 8-point scale the likelihood that they would buy from this firm if New Format 2 were adopted (1 = "definitely less likely," 8 = "definitely more likely") and to indicate which price format made the price change look more appealing (1 = "definitely format 1," 8 = "definitely format 2"). As a manipulation check the perceived value of the infrastructural components was measured by an attractiveness rating on a 7-point scale (-3 = "very unattractive," 3 = "very attractive").
The participants were 218 members of the same database used for the first experiment, randomly selected from among those who had not yet participated and recruited via e-mail. A preliminary analysis showed no effect of the within-subjects allocation of replicates. The data were collapsed across dependent measures by averaging individual scores (α = .78). Inclusion of product category as a covariate was not significant so the data were also aggregated across replicates. The initial analysis confirmed that the perceived value of infrastructural components was manipulated as intended: participants rated infrastructural components related to their needs as more attractive than those that were unrelated (M good deal = 1.58 versus M bad deal = -.81; t(429) = 5.06, p < .001).
Hypothesis testing was conducted using ANOVA and planned orthogonal contrasts. or the other price format is preferred.
Study 2: Integration Bias Under Disaggregate Pricing
The previous study demonstrates the irrelevance of infrastructural components under aggregate pricing. What remains unclear, however, is how important these infrastructural components become once a specific price is assigned to them. Normatively, we might expect consumers to weigh each individual component according to its relative monetary worth. On the other hand, evidence in the marketing literature suggests that individuals typically integrate product information with biases (Gaeth et al. 1990; Kahn and Meyer 1991) . Our framework suggests that consumer preferences will systematically outweigh the importance of infrastructural components, the value of which is easier to assess than that of focal components.
The relative weight of components can be studied by holding total expense constant and measuring changes in product evaluations as the ratio of component prices is experimentally manipulated. To this end we define:
Component Price Ratio (CPR) = Price of Focal Component Price of Infrastructural Component
If a decrease in the CPR leads to a decrease in the product's overall evaluation (and the converse) one should conclude that the evaluation is driven by the price of the infrastructural component; that is, that price decreases at the level of the focal component fail to compensate for price increases at the level of the infrastructural component. Study 1 has shown that when the infrastructural component is not considered attractive aggregated price formats are preferred. Similarly, for a given level of component attractiveness, if the relative price of the infrastructural component rises too high (for a fixed total price) aggregated price formats should become preferable.
Pre-Test
Thirty six undergraduate students participated in a pre-test conducted to elicit for ten pairs of focal and infrastructural components mean and variance estimates of willingness to pay (WTP). Participants approached on campus were asked to fill out a brief questionnaire.
5 Table 2 
Method
Study 2 employed a single-factor, six-level design. The six CPR levels included one aggregate and five disaggregate pricing conditions. Of the latter, one condition reproduced the WTP mean values collected in the pre-test; the remainder featured different price splits at $3 intervals. Table 3 lists all of these combinations together with the coding used for the analysis. Note that in all cases total expense was held constant across conditions. .640 * Participants were asked their willingness to pay for each component as well as the minimum and maximum price at which they would still consider purchasing. The adjusted variance measure is calculated by representing the price range (maximum -minimum) as a percentage of the mean WTP.
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Participants were shown two purchase situations and told that they were interested in buying the product portrayed (the choice set included only one alternative). Each participant was then asked to rank three statements. "I consider this offer a good buy" (1 = "strongly disagree," 9 = "strongly agree"). "Do you perceive this to be a good or bad deal?" (1 = "a very bad deal." 9 = "a very good deal"). "The probability that I would buy from this seller is …" (1 = "very low," 9 = "very high").
Appendix C replicates the stimulus used for the books category. The 250 participants in this study were members of the same subject pool who had not participated in either of the previous two studies.
Other procedural steps were the same as for those studies. 
Results
The three dependent measures being highly correlated (α = .94) as expected, the remainder of the analysis is based on an aggregate preference score. Given that both the within-subjects allocation of stimuli and use of product category as a covariate failed to reach significance in a one-way ANOVA, the data were also collapsed across replicates.
The first prediction was that, for the same total price, overall evaluation of a product would increase (decrease) monotonically as the ratio of component prices gradually increased (decreased).
The pattern of results depicted in Figure 2 is consistent with this hypothesis. Statistically, a polynomial contrast revealed the expected linear effect (F(5, 504) = 20.11, p < .001). Four independent-sample ttests explored the trend in detail: excepting the first, each increase in the CPR proved significantly higher than the previous one (p = .431, p = .072, p = .001, and p = .056, respectively). 
FIGURE 2: Composite Preference Measure by Experimental Condition (Study 2).

Discussion
The results of Study 2 reinforce our general framework that links price format to preference formation.
In this experiment we concentrated on preferences under disaggregate pricing in order to test the prediction that infrastructural components become overly salient when assigned their own price in the transaction. The argument put forward to account for this effect is that for consumers infrastructural is the consequence of a disparity in the internal coding of price differentials. The numerical cognition literature suggests that the psychological distance between them affects how numbers are processed (Dehaene 1992) . Specifically, the magnitude effect indicates that, for equal numerical distance, it is easier to discriminate between small numbers (e.g., 1 versus 2) than large numbers (e.g., 8 versus 9).
Given that focal components typically account for the majority of an expense, this logic implies that any deviation from the consumer's WTP is likely to have a stronger impact on the evaluation of infrastructural components.
The following study attempts to rule out these alternative explanations by manipulating experimentally instead of inferring the diagnosticity of the infrastructural component. Doing so generates a set of predictions that, if confirmed, would be inconsistent with either of the competing accounts.
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Study 3: The Impact of Diagnosticity on Component Weights
The main objective of this experiment is to verify that the weight of individual components following price disaggregation is, indeed, determined by their relative diagnosticity. To achieve the related goal of ruling out competing explanations compatible with the results of Study 2 we modify the experimental design used in that study to include component diagnosticity as an independent variable.
We hypothesize a pattern of responses that is both consistent with and unique to our theory.
Predicted Effects
To manipulate diagnosticity the stimuli should be based on product categories for which the evaluation of either type of component is vague (e.g., trees and eyewear in Table 2 ). Starting from this "sterile"
condition it is possible to capture the effect of diagnosticity on the relative weight of focal and infrastructural components. Specifically, for a total expense of constant value and a gradual increase in the price of the infrastructural component, overall product evaluations should (1) decrease monotonically when the infrastructural component alone is diagnostic (as in Study 2), (2) increase monotonically when the focal component alone is diagnostic, (3) remain constant when neither component is diagnostic, and (4) decrease when both components are diagnostic and either component is priced above the stated WTP (this inverted-U function is the result of loss aversion).
The advantage of manipulating diagnosticity is that the expected results are inconsistent with those predicted by all alternative explanations. Indeed, according to these accounts any increase in the price of infrastructural components should lead to lower product evaluations, irrespective of component diagnosticity.
Method
The experiment employed a 3 (CPR: H/L, WTP/WTP, L/H) × 4 (component diagnosticity: neither, focal only, infrastructural only, both) between-subjects design. The first factor, CPR, was replicated from Study 2 but restricted, for simplicity, to only three levels: the WTP mean values collected in a pre-test (Table 2) and two price splits with each component offered both below and above the stated WTP. Total expense was again held constant across conditions. The second factor, component diagnosticity, was manipulated by adding component market prices to the stimuli when necessary.
These prices were justified by experience with the category.
The layout of the stimuli, experimental procedure, and dependent measures were identical to those used in Study 2 save for the following changes. First, we drew from the pre-test in Study 2 to select the two product categories with the highest variance in component WTP. This criterion was used to ensure an efficient manipulation of component diagnosticity. The focal component of the first category was a Christmas tree (WTP: $40), the infrastructural component the netting ($6.50 ). In the second category the components were prescription glasses ($165) and anti-scratch proofing ($45), respectively. 6 Second, participants were asked to indicate for each component, in addition to the three original preference measures, their WTP and degree of confidence in that assessment. Answers to the second question served as a manipulation check for component diagnosticity.
As in all previous experiments within-subjects allocation of stimuli to participants was such as to ensure no repetition and complete randomization of conditions. Participants were 553 members of the online subject pool. All other procedural steps dealing with selection and recruitment were the same.
Results
As was the case in Study 2, the three preference measures were highly correlated (α = .92) and a composite preference score was calculated by averaging these values. An ANOVA with product 24 category as a covariate and the allocation of stimuli as a within-subjects factor indicated that neither variable was statistically significant. For the main analysis the data were collapsed across replicates.
A series of planned contrasts verified that component diagnosticity was manipulated correctly.
As The key results of this experiment are summarized in Figure 3 . Overall, the effect of component diagnosticity on preferences is consistent with the proposed framework, producing a pattern of results that contradicts any of the competing explanations that surfaced in the discussion of On a broader scale, it is important to note that each of the first three studies has drawn conclusions about inconsistencies in the evaluation and integration of components by observing discrepancies in aggregate product-level preferences. With that in mind, we argue that a more definitive test of the proposed theory would involve analysis of the phenomenon directly at the component level. To that end, the purpose of Study 4 is to decompose preferences as suggested.
Study 4: Predicting Consumer Response Using Component-Level Evaluations
In the previous studies consumers were evaluating a multicomponent good as a whole and variations in their evaluations suggested that the weighting of focal and infrastructural components was influenced by price format. In the present study, instead of inferring the presence of price format-dependent component weights we directly elicit the value of the separate components to test our theory's prediction about the presence of a bias in the way component evaluations are combined to produce a product-level evaluation. According to the proposed framework the relative weight assigned to each component should depend on price format. When the price is aggregated we predict greater weight on the focal element. Conversely, disaggregate pricing leads to accentuation of the infrastructural component's valuation.
For each price format the present study elicits both component and overall product evaluations.
Four simple rules-of-thumb ('algorithms') are used to combine component evaluations (see Table 4 ).
We hypothesize that the impact of price format on product evaluation will be better captured when aggregation is biased towards the infrastructural component in the presence of a disaggregated price. In other words, the algorithms' ICO (score based on the infrastructural component only) and EW (equal weighting of components) will capture the impact of price format more accurately than the FCO (score based on the focal component only) and MVW (weighting according to monetary worth). 
Method
The experiment employed a 2 (price format: aggregate vs. disaggregate) × 2 (product evaluation: actual vs. calculated) between-subjects design. Each participant was asked to evaluate two product categories, a DVD rental and a cell phone service. As in all previous experiments within-subjects allocation of stimuli was randomized and duplicated conditions were ruled out. Infrastructural components were incoming and out-going shipping and handling and roaming and interstate connection (Appendix D replicates the scenario used in the cell phone service stimulus), respectively. For each scenario participants were asked to rate the attractiveness of one offer using a 10-point scale (1 = "highly unattractive," 10 = "highly attractive"). Depending on the condition, price information was aggregated or disaggregated and participants rated either the overall product or each of the three components individually. The141 participants were recruited from the same subject pool according to the same procedure discussed previously.
Results
Prior to analyzing the data the individual component evaluations were integrated according to the importance weights specified by each of the algorithms in Table 4 . The four calculated preference scores were then used in the ANOVA as one level of the product evaluation factor. A preliminary analysis found no significant effect for within-subjects allocation of replicates. Including product 28 category as a covariate also failed to achieve significance, hence, the data were collapsed across replicates.
A separate ANOVA was conducted for each of the four algorithms tested (see Figure 4) . Participants were asked to read the scenario and evaluate the offer on three dimensions (using the same preference scales as in Studies 2 and 3). Manipulation checks carried out on the second component included (a) measuring its perceived value using a scale from -3 ("very unattractive") to 3
("very attractive") and (b) measuring its relative importance on two 1-7 scales (see Appendix E). The 365 participants in this experiment were members of the same subject pool used in the previous studies. The experiment was conducted online and a $5 remuneration paid upon completion. Other procedural steps dealing with selection and recruitment were unchanged from the earlier experiments.
We begin with the manipulation checks. 
Discussion
The main objective of this experiment was to demonstrate an important limitation of the influence of price format on perceptions of value. To this end, we have shown price format to have no significant effect on the evaluation of a second component that assumes an important role in addressing a participant's needs. This result supports the broader proposition that aggregate pricing leads to heuristic processing only when an infrastructural component is present. Replacing this peripheral element with one that is more central to consumers provokes a thorough, judicious consideration of the product that is unlikely to ignore any potential benefit or detriment, irrespective of size.
General Discussion
The principal objective of this paper was to systematically investigate the link between price format and consumer preference and to suggest a simple mechanism that jointly explains this contingency.
Earlier research offered conflicting conclusions, some researchers claiming that disaggregated prices increased demand by exploiting inconsistencies in the way consumers form their preferences, others emphasizing the negative effect of price partitioning on the perceived expense.
Our five studies support the general hypothesis that consumer preference is affected by price format. Moreover, the observed direction of this impact is consistent with our suggested mechanism.
Preferences are generally insensitive to variations in the perceived value of infrastructural components presented with an aggregated price that seems to have the effects of inducing consumers to concentrate on the focal component of the offer. In contrast, disaggregate pricing leads consumers to account for the deal obtained with respect to the infrastructural component. Because the infrastructural component usually benefits from superior diagnosticity, consumers presented with a disaggregated price will place an exaggerated weight on their evaluation of the infrastructural component. Our results show how this simple mechanism is sufficient to determine whether aggregate or disaggregate pricing leads to greater perceived value. Moreover, by testing some of the more peculiar implications of this mechanism we were able to rule out a number of alternative explanations. The experimental results reveal price to be important not only because of the direct disutility it provides, but also because of its indirect effect on the way consumers perceive product benefits. More specifically, consumer research typically assumes price to be an objective, sterile attribute the tangible nature of which precludes meaningful interaction with other product attributes and information processing. This work makes the additional argument that pricing can affect as much as capture 35 perceived value: our results are consistent with recent efforts that view price as a stimulus or incentive for consumers to consider the full set of contingencies implied by their choices (Shiv, Carmon, and Ariely 2005; Wathieu and Bertini 2005) .
With respect to previous work on price partitioning, the main contribution of this paper is its detailed account of consumer response to alternative ways of framing price information, which parsimoniously resolves some of the methodological and theoretical ambiguities present in the existing literature. An important objective was to identify a single mechanism that could account for the presence of both disaggregate and aggregate pricing in practice.
Finally, this paper offers clear and specific recommendations for practice. Research has demonstrated that consumers form rich inferences about firms' intentions from their behavior (e.g. Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986) . Two factors that clearly influence these conclusions are the way products and prices are presented in the market. This paper presents one account of how these variables might interact to shape perceptions by showing price format to be an effective means of channeling consumers' attention from one type of component to another. Firms that market differentiated focal components should mask irrelevant infrastructural benefits by posting aggregated prices (price together to hide futility). Conversely, firms that offer a commoditized product might well consider disaggregated prices if the infrastructural component is attractive (price separately to derail attention).
Although this research emphasizes an information processing perspective, we recognize the multidimensional nature of the topic and likelihood that other factors or interpretations also influence the relationship between price format and preference formation. In particular, whereas our framework relies on differences in the relative salience of components to motivate the analysis, related issues such as fairness, expectations, and sunk costs might also be relevant. Future research could extend this line 36 of investigation by incorporating some or all of the above concerns. That said, it is our opinion that alternative interpretations should remain sufficiently flexible to account for the presence of both aggregate and disaggregate pricing in practice.
